Abstract. We study three kinds of compactness in some variants of Gödel logic: compactness, entailment compactness, and approximate entailment compactness. For countable first-order underlying language we use the Henkin construction to prove the compactness property of extensions of first-order Gödel logic enriched by nullary connective or the Baaz's projection connective. In the case of uncountable first-order language we use the ultraproduct method to derive the compactness theorem.
Introduction
Compactness theorem is one of the most important theorems in classical first-order logic. This theorem says that any finitely satisfiable theory is satisfiable. Certainly, this property provides a procedure to find models of a theory whose finite subsets have models. So, it could be considered as a foundation for model theoretical studies of any logic. Due to the fact that the model theory of mathematical fuzzy logic is still underdeveloped, study of compactness property would be a topic of interest in the area of mathematical fuzzy logic. In the case of t-norm based fuzzy logics and their extensions, this is done by several authors [Háj98, BZ98, NB01, Ger01, CN04, BYU10, Pre03, Cin05, TPD11, PT12].
Among t-norm based fuzzy logics, three of them are quite important (Gödel , Lukasiewicz , and product logic). So, almost all studies around compactness property are done for these triple.Note that various kinds of compactness are available for t-norm based fuzzy logic, e.g., compactness [NB01, Ger01, CN04, Cin05] , entailment compactness [BZ98, Pre03, Cin05] and K-compactness [Cin05, TPD11, PT12] where K is a closed subset of standard truth value set [0, 1]. The usual compactness is the same as {1}-compactness. Let us remind that a logic enjoys the entailment compactness if for every theory T and sentence ϕ, T |= ϕ implies the existence of a finite subset T ′ of T such that T ′ |= ϕ. In first-order Gödel logic, different truth value sets cause different results about compactness. A truth value set in general is taken to be any linearly ordered Heyting algebra D. The standard truth value set is commonly assumed to be a Gödel set which is a closet subset of [0, 1] containing 0 and 1. The first-order Gödel logic whose truth value set is a Gödel set V is denoted by G V . Recently, all tree mentioned instance of compactness are studied for Gödel set G V [PT12, Pre03] . Furthermore, [Pre03] studies the extensions of Gödel logic G V by ∆ Baaz projection connective.
In Lukasiewicz logic as well as its extension such as rational Pavelka logic (RPL) and continuous first-order logic (CFO) the compactness theorem is extensively studied in several frameworks [Háj98, CEG07, EGGN07, Pav79, TPD11, BYU10]. The continuity of logical connectives of Lukasiewicz logic with respect to the usual order topology on [0, 1] is the main reason for the compactness theorem to be held in these logics. By different methods such as Henkin construction, Pavelka completeness, and ultraproduct method the compactness theorem proved in these logics.
Study of the compactness property for extensions of Gödel logic is different from two viewpoints. Firstly, the Gödel logic implication is not a continuous function with respect to the usual order topology on Gödel sets. So, the Pavelka method and ultraproduct method could not be used directly in extensions of Gödel logic. However, a modification of these methods may work here. Secondly, the corresponding algebras with respect to the extensions of Gödel logics can not be embedded into the standard truth value sets (Gödel sets) unless the algebras are at most countable. But, we need such an embedding to prove the compactness theorem by the Henkin construction . So, the Henkin construction only works for theories with at most countable first-order underlying languages.
We consider two approaches to prove the compactness property in extensions of Gödel logics. The first one is based on the Henkin construction, and so it works only for theories with at most countable first-order underlying languages. The other approach is based on the ultraproduct method. We consider a metric on Gödel sets such that the logical connectives of the corresponding extension of Gödel logic are continuous with respect to the new metric.
In Lukasiewicz logic if "e" is a similarity relation, then the interpretation of "1 − e" becomes a pseudometric. But, we have not a logical connective such as "minus" in Gödel logic. However, if one considers a reverse semantical meaning on truth value set, the interpretation of similarity relation will be a pseudometric in any t-norm based fuzzy logic. Furthermore, assuming such a semantic leads to obtain a pseudometric on the corresponding algebras of the logic. Besides these two pseudometrics, the continuity of logical connectives and also continuity of the interpretation of function and predicate symbols are directly intelligible. So, using the ultraproduct method motivates us to consider a reverse semantical meaning on Gödel sets which we call it the metrically semantic of the logic. Thus, 0 stands for absolute truth while 1 for absolute falsity. Anyway, we present a translation of results for the everyday Gödel logic in the final section.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the main notions of extensions of Gödel logic such as logical connectives, metrically semantic, satisfiability, and so forth. Section 3 studies the main concept of the paper by studding different notions of compactness in several kinds of extensions of Gödel logic. Section 4 presents the notion of ultrametric structure and prove the compactness property for some variants of Gödel logics without any limitation on the size of the underlying first-order language. In the last section, a translation of results for the usual semantic (in which 0 stands for falsity) is given.
Preliminaries
The logic that we will consider in this paper is the Gödel logic whose semantic is based on Gödel sets, i.e, subsets of unite interval [0, 1] containing 0 and 1 and closed under the standard order topology. Logical symbols of the first-order Gödel logic are the usual connectives of classical first-order logic {∧, →, ⊥} together with the quantifiers {∀, ∃} and a countable set of variables.
We use a reverse semantical meaning on the set of truth values. Indeed, this assumption makes the interpretation of similarity relation a pseudometric. So, semantically 0 is the absolute truth and 1 is the absolute falsity of the truth value set.
When a Gödel set V is considered as the set of truth values, we use the notion G V for corresponding Gödel logic. Enriching G V by a countable set of nullary connectivesĀ = {r : r ∈ A ⊆ V \ {0, 1}} leads to an extension of Gödel logic, G V,A . Observe that the nullary connective1 is actually ⊥. Another extension of Gödel logic is obtained by adding the unary connective ∆. The corresponding Gödel logics equipped by ∆ are denoted by G • G n : V = {r 1 , ..., r n } ∪ {0, 1} and A = {r 1 , ..., r n } where 0 < r 1 < r 2 < ... < r n−1 < r n < 1.
•
Definition 2.4. Let ϕ(x) be an L-formula and T be an L-theory.
(1) An L-structure M is called a model of ϕ(x), if there isā ∈ M n such that ϕ M (ā) = 0. In such a case, we write M |= ϕ(ā). For any Gödel set V and A ⊆ V , the axioms of the Gödel logic G V,A are the axioms of first-order Gödel logic [Háj98] together with the book-keeping axioms listed in Table 1 . 
Book-keeping axioms for nullary connectives
5. An L-sentence ϕ is proved by an L-theory T , T ⊢ ϕ, whenever there is a finite sequence
of L-sentences such that:
• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n either ϕ i ∈ T or ϕ i is an axiom or it is followed by rules from axioms and other ϕ j 's for 1 ≤ j < i.
We write ⊢ ϕ whenever ∅ ⊢ ϕ. T is called a consistent theory if T ⊥.
Note that if A = ∅ then for any 0 < r < 1, T = {r} is a consistent theory in G V,A . However, T is not a satisfiable theory. In the next section we introduced the notion of strongly consistency which is equivalent to the notion of satisfiability in some extensions of Gödel logics. The deduction theorem follows easily.
Theorem 2.6. In the Gödel logic G V,A , for an L-theory T and L-sentences ϕ and ψ, T ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ → ψ.
Obviously if T ⊢ ϕ, then T |= ϕ and also T f |= ϕ. In spite of first-order logic, the concept of proof does not coincide completely with the concept of finitely entailment in Gödel logics enriched by nullary connectives.
Example 2.7. Let A = ∅. One could easily verify that in the Gödel logic
where ρ is a nullary predicate symbol and r ∈ A \ {0, 1}, then ¬¬ρ →r |= ¬ρ while ¬¬ρ →r ¬ρ.
Remark 2.8. For Gödel logics enriched by ∆ connective, there are some additional axioms and rules.
Definition 2.9. A Gödel logic has complete recursive axiomatization whenever |= ϕ if and only if ⊢ ϕ for every L-sentence ϕ. This kind of completeness is sometimes called w eak completeness.
Definition 2.10. A Gödel logic is said to have the strong completeness whenever for every L-theory T and L-sentence ϕ, T |= ϕ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ.
First-order Gödel logic G R admits both kinds of completeness with respect to any countable first-order language [Háj98] . When A = ∅ example 2.7 shows that the strong completeness fails in G [0,1],A while it is shown that G [0,1],A is completely recursive axiomatizable [EGN09] .
One of the most useful tools in model theory of classical first-order logic is the compactness theorem. In the case of mathematical fuzzy logic this theorem has different aspects. Definition 2.13. We say that a Gödel logic has the compactness property if for every theory T , T is satisfiable if and only if T is finitely satisfiable.
Since a proof is a finite sequence of conclusions, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.14. If a logic admits the strong completeness then it enjoys the triple kinds of compactness mentioned above.
Specially, in the Gödel logic G R both entailment compactness and compactness hold.
Theorem 2.15.
[Pre03] The entailment compactness and complete recursive axiomatization (weak completeness) are equivalent in Gödel logic G V .
Furthermore, Prening [Pre03] shows the Gödel logic G V admits the entailment compactness property if and only if either V is a finite Gödel set or the perfect kernel of V includes 1 or the perfect kernel of V is nonempty and 1 is an isolated point of V . Particularly, he shows that the entailment compactness fails in G V for countable Gödel set V .
Later, Pourmahdian et al. [PT12] show that if V is a finite Gödel set or the perfect kernel of V includes 1 or 1 is an isolated point of V then G V admits the compactness property.
Compactness in Gödel logic
In this section, we study the compactness property of Gödel logics G [0,1],A and also G ∆ [0,1],A . From now on assume that A ′ is denoted for the set of limit points of A in a Gödel set V with respect to the order topology on V . Firstly, note that if A has a limit point a = 0 with respect to the order topology and a ∈ A ∪ {1}, then the compactness fails in
) and assume that L = {ρ} where ρ is a nullary predicate symbol.
). Obviously T is finitely satisfiable, but it is not satisfiable.
Example 3.2. Let a ∈ A ′ but a / ∈ A∪{1}. Also assume that there is an increasing sequence
} where ρ is a nullary predicate symbol and R(x) is a unary predicate symbol.
. T is finitely satisfiable, but it is not satisfiable. Indeed if M |= T , then ∀x R(x) M = a and so the interpretation of ρ in M makes no sense.
Specially, RGL does not admit the compactness property. However, if one consider some non-standard truth value set, the compactness may hold on RGL. [KPT13] prove that the compactness property is hold on RGL within a semantic on the non-standard truth value set I = [0, 1] 2 \ {(0, r) : r > 0}. Now, using the Henkin construction, we show in the case that the set of limit points of A is at most {0}, the Gödel logic G [0,1],A admits the compactness property. Observe that this method is based on constructing the Gödel algebra of equivalence classes of formulas modulo a theory, and then embedding this Gödel algebra into the unit interval [0, 1], where the countability of the language L is a prerequisite necessary assumption for existence of such an embedding. In the next section, we prove the compactness property for some extensions of Gödel logics in which the requirement of such an assumption is not obligatory. (1) . ∧ is the join (lub) operator and . ∨ is the meet (glb) operator. (2) . ∧ and . → form an adjoint pair, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ D, a .
The Gödel algebra with respect to the Gödel logic G ∆ V,A is formed by the corresponding Gödel algebra with respect to G V,A , i.e., D = D, .
∧, . ∨, . →, {r D : r ∈ A ∪ {0, 1}} together with a unary operation δ D which acts as follows. 
Usual Compactness.
As already mentioned, if A = ∅ then for any 0 < r < 1, T = {r} is a consistent theory in G V,A which is not satisfiable. So, when A = ∅ we use the "strongly consistency" instead of "consistency". Definition 3.6. An L-theory T is called strongly consistent if T r for r ∈ A ∪ {1} (i.e, r > 0).
Observe that every satisfiable theory is strongly consistent. We show that when A ′ ⊆ {0}, strongly consistent theories are satisfiable. Note that Examples 3.1 and 3.2 gives strongly consistent theories which are not satisfiable in the Gödel logic G [0,1],A when A ′ {0}. Two different concepts "finitely entailment" and "proof" bring us two kinds of Henkin and complete theories.
Definition 3.7. Let T be an L-theory.
(1) T is Henkin if for every universal L-formula ∀x ϕ(x) that is not finitely entailed by T , there is
(2) T is deductively Henkin or d-Henkin if for every universal L-formula ∀x ϕ(x) that is not proved by T , there is a witness constant symbol c in L such that T ϕ(c). 
The following theorem leads to deduced the compactness property for the Gödel logic Because T is a complete theory, (Lind(T ), ) is a linearly ordered set. Now, we obtain a countable linearly ordered Gödel algebra L T from Lind(T ) by setting, The canonical L-structure M T of T is made as follows.
a) The universe of M T is the set of all closed L-terms CM (T ). b) For each n-ary function symbol f , define
c) For each n-ary predicate symbol P , define
For the case that A ′ = ∅, the compactness property of G [0,1],A follows from Theorem 3.8 and the following theorem.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent L theory and L ′ be the extended of L with countably many new constant symbols. Enumerate all pairs of L ′ -sentences by {(θ i , ψ i )} i∈N . Also assume that {ϕ i (x)} i∈N be the set of all L ′ -formulas with one free variable. Now, we construct inductively sequences {T n } n∈N of L ′ -theories and {χ n } n∈N of L ′ -sentences such that for each n ∈ N, T n χ n . stage 0: Let T 0 = T and
Obviously, χ 0 > 0 and since T is strongly consistent,
Let c i be a constant symbol of L ′ not occurring in ϕ i (x) and the constructed objects until the current stage. Consider two cases.
Case 1:
χ n ∨ϕ i (c i ) using (Gen) and (G∀3) we have T n ⊢ χ n ∨∀x ϕ i (x). So, by definition of the connective ∨ and the fact that T n χ n we have T n ∪ {∀x ϕ i (x) → χ n } ⊢ χ n . Thus, using the proof-by-case property and the fact that T n χ n , we have T n ∪ {χ n → ∀x ϕ i (x)} χ n that is T n+1 χ n+1 . Now, let T ′ = ∪ n∈N T n . Clearly T ′ is strongly consistent, since otherwise if T ′ ⊢r for some r ∈ A ∪ {1} then by (RG2(a)) T ′ ⊢ χ 0 . So, for some n ∈ N, T n ⊢ χ 0 which implies that T n ⊢ χ n , a contradiction. On the other hand, clearly T ′ is deductively complete. Now, if T ′ ∀x ϕ i (x) then T 2i+1 χ 2i+1 ∨ϕ i (c i ), since otherwise by case 2 of stage n+1 we have T 2i+1 ⊢ χ 2i+1 ∨ ∀x ϕ i (x) which implies that T 2i+2 ⊢ ∀x ϕ i (x), a contradiction. Thus, T 2i+2 = T 2i+1 and
Corollary 3.10. For countable first-order language L, the Gödel logic G * n admit the compactness property.
Remark 3.11. By Example 2.7 we know that the strong completeness fails in G * n . Indeed, when T ∪{ϕ} ⊆ Sent(L), A = ∅, and T ϕ one could not obtain a deductively complete d-Henkin extension
For example, the theory T = {¬¬ρ →r} in Example 2.7 could not be extend to a deductively complete theory
The method used in Theorem 3.9 could not be used for the case that A ′ = {0}. To prove the compactness property of G [0,1],A for the case that A ′ = {0} we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. Let T be a maximally strongly consistent L-theory and ϕ and ψ be two arbitrary Lsentences. For the Gödel logic
Proof.
(1) and (2) are straightforward. For (3) we show that T ∪ {ϕ} is strongly consistent. Suppose, , to derive a contradiction, that T ∪ {ϕ} is not strongly consistent. So, there is r ∈ A ∪ {1} such that T ∪ {ϕ} ⊢r. Thus, T ⊢ ϕ →r. Since A ′ = {0}, there is s ∈ A ∪ {1} such that s < r. By the assumption s → ϕ ∈ T . i.e, T ⊢s → ϕ. Hence, by transitivity property of proof T ⊢s →r and by RG2(b), T ⊢r. A contradiction.
Observe that by Zorn's lemma, any strongly consistent L-theory T contained in a maximally strongly consistent L-theory. The following theorem show that this maximally strongly consistent extension could be chosen in a language L ′ ⊇ L such that it is Henkin. So, in the light of Theorem 3.8 the compactness property of G [0,1],A is established for the case that A ′ = {0} and L is a countable first-order language.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory. T ′ will be constructed in countably many phases. Indeed, T ′ is a maximally strongly consistent theory containing the union of countably many maximally strongly consistent L i -theories T i in which for every i ≥ 1, L i have a witness constant for each unprovable sentence ∀x ϕ(x) where ϕ(x) ∈ F orm(L i−1 ). To this end, consider the following notions.
• For nullary connectivesr ands and formula ϕ(x), θ ϕ(x),r,s = (r → ∀x ϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s).
• For each i ≥ 1, Secondly, let L ′ = n≥0 L n and take a maximally strongly consistent L ′ -theory T ′ , containing
then by maximality of T ′ and Lemma 3.12-3 there is r ∈ A ∪ {1} such thatr → ∀x ϕ(x) / ∈ T ′ . Now, as A ′ = {0} take s ∈ A ∪ {1} such that s < r. As, (r → ∀x ϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s) ∈ T ′ , maximality of T ′ and Lemma 3.12-2 implies that ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s ∈ T ′ . Thus, by Lemma 3.12-3 T ′ ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ), and the proof is completed. However, the method we use in this subsection based on the notion of "finitely entailment" while the method used in the previous subsection is based on the notion of "proof" and the concept of "strongly consistency".
The following example show that the entailment compactness fails on G * ↓ .
Example 3.15. let L = {ρ} where ρ is a nullary predicate symbol. Let T = { 1 n → ρ} n∈N . One can easily verify that in the Gödel logic G *
However, when A ′ = {0}, the approximate entailment compactness holds in
Theorem 3.16. Let L be a countable first-order language, T be an L-theory, and ϕ be an L-sentence. Proof. Let T |= ϕ. We want to show that T f |=r → ϕ for all r ∈ A ∪ {1}. Suppose not. So, there exists r 0 ∈ A ∪ {1} such that for any finite subset S of T , S ✓ ✓ |= r 0 → ϕ. Thus, for any finite subset S of T there is a model M of S such that M ✓ ✓ |= r 0 → ϕ, which means that M |= ϕ → r 0 . Thus, for any finite subset S of T , S ∪ {ϕ → r 0 } is satisfiable. Hence, compactness property of G [0,1],A implies that T ∪ {ϕ → r 0 } is satisfiable which is in contradict with T |= ϕ. Conversely, suppose that for any r ∈ A ∪ {1}, T f |=r → ϕ. We want to show that T |= ϕ. Since T has a model, by reductio ad absurdum suppose that there exists a model M of T such that M ✓ ✓ |= ϕ. But because A ′ = {0}, one could find r ∈ A ∪ {1} such that ϕ M ≥ r. This means for any finite subset S of T , S ✓ ✓ |=r → ϕ, a contradiction.
On the other hand, G * n enjoys the entailment compactness. This follows from the following two lemmas. By the same way as the proof of Theorem 3.8 and replacing ⊢ by f |= we obtain an L-structure M T |= T .
But then since A ′ = ∅, the proof of Lemma 3.5 show that , T is finitely satisfiable but it is not satisfiable.
Compactness when the underlying language is uncountable
As already mentioned, all the compactness results in Gödel logics are restricted by the countability of the underlying language. The following example shows that when the underlying language is uncountable, the compactness fails in almost all extensions of Gödel logics.
Example 4.1. [Jeř14] Let L be a relational language contains uncountably many unary predicate symbols {R(x)} ∪ {ρ i (x)} i∈(ω1+1) . Set, . Regarding the first-order Gödel logic, it is seen that the absolute truth and absolute falsity has an asymmetry. Indeed, not falsity could be stated while it is impossible to separate truth from not truth. The outcome of equipping the Gödel logic with ∆ is objective as a kind of symmetry. Indeed, not only one could states "not truth" as well as the "not falsity", but also we have a symmetry in items (5) and (6), and also the results are hold in both semantical views of the Gödel logic.
A future interesting topic to study is the model theoretical aspects of G ↓ , G * ↓ and G ∆ [0,1] . Indeed, the expressive power of the language of this logics for stating "M ✓ ✓ |= ϕ" by means of "M |= ¬∆(ϕ)" or "there is a natural number n such that M |= ϕ →1 n ", helps us to develop the model theory of these logics.
